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The morality of virtual representations and the enactment of prohibited activities within single-
player gamespace (e.g., murder, rape, paedophilia) continues to be debated and, to date, a 
consensus is not forthcoming. Various moral arguments have been presented (e.g., virtue theory 
and utilitarianism) to support the moral prohibition of virtual enactments, but their applicability to 
gamespace is questioned. In this paper, I adopt a meta-ethical approach to moral utterances about 
virtual representations, and ask what it means when one declares that a virtual interaction ‘is 
morally wrong’. In response, I present constructive ecumenical expressivism to (i) explain what 
moral utterances should be taken to mean, (ii) argue that they mean the same when referring to 
virtual and non-virtual interactions and (iii), given (ii), explain why consensus with regard to 
virtual murder, rape and paedophilia is not forthcoming even though such consensus is readily 
found with regard to their non-virtual equivalents. 
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1. Introduction 
The issue of whether virtual representation and enactment (hereafter, VR/Es) within single-
player video games should be the subject of moral scrutiny and the corollary concerning 
whether they should be morally policed continues to be debated (see Young, 2013, for a 
detailed discussion).1 Those positioned within the amoralist camp, as the name suggests, hold 
that VR/Es are not a morally matter. Among the reasons given for this is that a physical 
description reveals VR/Es to involve nothing more than the manipulation of pixels. Even if 
one moves beyond the physical description, so as to include reference to what the pixels are 
designed to represent – say, a brutal assault on an innocent victim – given that this 
representation is taking place within, and in fact should be confined to, the space of play, any 
putative moral concern is ultimately misplaced: for what is occurring is just a game. In 
contrast, there are those who, for various reasons, consider that such game content should be 
the subject of moral concern. Focusing on this group, which I will call moralists, how should 
we understand their declaration that it is legitimate for certain VR/Es (say, those involving 
murder or sexual assault or paedophilia) to be judged morally wrong? In other words, what 
should we take this claim to mean? 
 
To be clear, I am not asking why moralists consider certain VR/Es to be morally wrong; nor 
am I concerned with whether statements pertaining to their moral wrongness (or rightness) are 
true or false. Instead, by adopting a meta-ethical approach, I seek to clarify what it means to 
say that some VR/Es are morally right or wrong, good or bad (although I accept that an 
                                                          
1 By ‘single-player video games’ I mean games played on personal computers (PCs) or consoles such as X-Box 
360/One, PlayStation 1-4, and Wii. Although such games may be available in formats that allow one player or a 
number of players (connected through the Internet) to play, I restrict discussion to situations in which a single 
player plays alongside and/or against non-player characters (NPCs). 
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answer to this question will help inform the ‘why’ question). After all, in order to continue the 
debate on gaming content, particularly content representing violent or otherwise taboo 
activities, we should be clear on what claims to moral wrongness or rightness mean within the 
context of single-player video games. A major aim of this paper, then, is to clarify the 
meaning of such moral utterances as a prerequisite to any further debate on the moral status of 
VR/Es. 
 
To illustrate the potential for moral ambiguity, is the proposition “VR/E(x) is morally wrong” 
truth-apt, insofar as any claim it makes about moral wrongness (or rightness) is capable of 
being true or false irrespective of whether it actually is? Or is it that such a claim is incapable 
of this because the idea of truth or falsity is meaningless in the present context: in much the 
same way as trying to establish the truth or falsity of the proposition “Boo VR/E(x)” is 
meaningless and therefore misguided. If “VR/E(x) is morally wrong” is truth-apt, then what is 
involved in the proposition being true or false? Conversely, if it is not truth-apt, then what 
should we take such a proposition to mean?  
 
In order to address the questions above – which specifically concern the meaning of moral 
claims about VR/Es – a useful strategy would be first to adopt a meta-ethical approach to 
more general moral statements. The same questions could therefore be directed towards the 
proposition “x is morally wrong”. Given this fact, whether a different conclusion should be 
drawn in relation to VR/Es will depend on the more general conclusions drawn regarding the 
truth-aptness of “x is morally wrong” and the applicability of these to propositions concerned 
with the moral status of VR/Es. It may be that any general conclusions are able to transcend 
the virtual and non-virtual spaces thus making them universally applicable and so able to 
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account for moral statements about VR/Es. Or it may be that the virtual and perhaps even 
playful nature of single-player gamespace prevents conclusions about the proposition 
“VR/E(x) is morally wrong” from being subsumed within the more general conclusions about 
x.2 
 
A further aim of this paper is therefore to contrast the propositions “x is morally wrong” and 
“VR/E(x) is morally wrong”, where VR/E(x) is a virtual representation/enactment of x. In the 
context of meta-ethics, do the two propositions convey the same moral meaning? If so, what 
does each statement mean, morally? If not, then why not? Is it, for example, that the amoralist 
is correct when it comes to moral judgements about single-player gamespace: namely, that 
there is no case to answer; meaning that, at best, the proposition is merely mimicking moral 
content? Alternatively, if they do convey the same meaning then what should we understand a 
moral statement to be and is such a statement able to convey truth-aptness in the case of 
murder and virtual murder, rape and virtual rape, paedophilia and virtual paedophilia (and so 
on), or is it that neither is truth-apt?  
 
It is my contention that the propositions “x is morally wrong” and “VR/E(x) is morally 
wrong” convey the same moral meaning insofar as each expresses the subject’s attitude 
towards x or VR/E(x), respectively. As such, I intend to argue against moral realism and 
endorse a form of expressivism which I am calling constructive ecumenical expressivism. 
Despite being anti-realist, this new approach is able to account for the high level of moral 
consensus (objectification) regarding views on the morality of murder or rape or paedophilia. 
It is able to explain why this is so in cases of non-virtual actions, but also why there is much 
                                                          
2 Owing to the need for brevity, the paper does not concern itself will the issue of morality and play. For 
discussion on this, see Young and Whitty (2012). 
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less moral consensus when it comes to the virtual representation and enactment of the 
aforementioned activities, leading some to the view that, despite the moralists objections, 
single-player gamespace should be an amoral space. 
 
Given that this is the first presentation of constructive ecumenical expressivism, it is 
important to spend some time preparing the way for this novel approach. In defence of 
constructive ecumenical expressivism, I begin by outlining problems with descriptivism and 
moral realism (Section 2). I then introduce moral supervenience (Section 3) and the constraint 
this imposes on one’s moral attitude towards identical actions and representations. Following 
this, I introduce those existing moral positions that have most influenced constructive 
ecumenical expressivism. I begin by outlining traditional expressivism (Section 4), then a 
variation on this, ecumenical expressivism (Sections 5), before introducing constructive 
sentimentalism (Section 6). After discussing the respective strengths of ecumenical 
expressivism and constructive sentimentalism, which I have integrated into this new meta-
ethical approach, I present the case for constructive ecumenical expressivism (Section 7). 
Finally, although the overarching aim of this paper is simply to give an account of the 
meaning of moral utterances within gamespace, towards the end of this section, I briefly 
discuss how this new meta-ethical approach might inform future debate on the morality of 
gaming content. 
 
2. Descriptivism and moral realism 
Should we understand the sentence “x is morally wrong” to be a description of some state of 
the world which captures a moral reality: namely, that x, so described, is literally picking out 
a moral wrongdoing? Descriptivism holds that moral language (such as the proposition “x is 
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morally wrong”) and non-moral language (for example, “Mount Everest is the highest 
mountain in the world”) share the same syntactic structure and must adhere to the same rules 
of logic. Therefore, in the same way that it is contradictory for Mount Everest to be described 
as both the highest and not the highest mountain in the world, so x cannot be described as 
morally wrong and not morally wrong without violating the same law of contradiction. 
Likewise, just as the proposition “Mount Everest is the highest mountain in the world” 
predicates Mount Everest with being the highest mountain, so “x is morally wrong” predicates 
x with having or being in a state of or constituting moral wrongness. 
 
In the case of the description of Mount Everest, however, what this description is said to be 
picking out – the highest mountain in the world – exists independently of the description. It is 
therefore an unremarkable fact that the truth or falsity of the description of Mount Everest is 
dependent on the truth or falsity of those independent characteristics of Mount Everest the 
description depicts. In other words, the truth or falsity of the proposition “Mount Everest is 
the highest mountain in the world” is dependent on the truth or falsity of Mount Everest being 
the highest mountain in the world. For the same to be said of moral descriptions, there must 
exist independent morally good or bad things for the description to pick out in a manner that 
makes the description either true or false. Consequently, when describing subject S as morally 
good, the possibility of this statement being true is dependent on the independent truth of S 
being morally good or of possessing some attribute correctly described as moral goodness. 
 
Descriptivism with regard to moral utterances is dependent on the truth of moral realism if it 
is to do anything more than postulate examples of correct syntax and non-contradictory 
propositions in the absence of an independently existing referent (such as “unicorns have a 
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horn and cannot be all black and all white” (see Shafer-Landau, 2003). The problem with 
descriptivism in the context of moral realism, however, is that moral utterances seem to be 
both descriptive and evaluative. They contain both an ‘is’ (descriptive) component and an 
‘ought’ (prescriptive) component, with the former being on a more secure metaphysical 
footing than the latter in terms of purporting facts about the world; that is, in terms of having 
truth-aptness.  
 
To illustrate: the proposition “x is morally wrong” contains a nominal descriptive component, 
x, but the second component seems to go beyond mere description. To describe x as ‘being 
wrong’ does not seem to be on par with describing x as cylindrical or as made of wood (for 
example). If someone were to say that “x is morally wrong” then how should we understand 
this utterance? What function does the predicate ‘is morally wrong’ serve and is this also 
served by the predicate ‘is cylindrical’? Certainly both tell us something about x. But do the 
predicates ‘is cylindrical’ and ‘is morally wrong’ each pick out independent properties of x?  
 
Where x is an action, the latter component (‘is morally wrong’) does not serve merely to 
describe action x in more detail. Uttering “shooting S is morally wrong”, adds more detail to x, 
insofar as we now know that it entails the shooting of S, but to then describe the action as 
morally wrong is to do more than simply add to the descriptive quality; rather, it functions to 
inform us that x (qua shooting S) is something that one ought not to do. What is not debated is 
that the descriptive component picks out some aspects of the world that is at least capable of 
being true or false: the occurrence of x or, more specifically, the shooting of S. Whether the 
same can be said of the latter component, however, is a more contentious issue (i.e., that the 
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act of shooting S has or is capable of having the property of ‘wrongness’ which is picked out 
within the subject’s description of x as being morally wrong). 
 
In the case of “shooting S is morally wrong”, the descriptive and evaluative components are 
easily demarcated. On other occasions, however, although this difference is less apparent, it is 
still to be found. Take the proposition “A is a murderer”. Here, the description of A as ‘a 
murderer’ is truth-apt given that A engaged in the premeditated and unlawful shooting (and 
killing) of S. But describing A as a murderer is also evaluative insofar as it intimates that what 
A has done (committed murder) is wrong and so ought not to have been done. But does the 
assertion that it is wrong to murder have truth-aptness? For the moral realist, to have truth-
aptness, wrongness must be a property of murder that can be picked out. There are lots of 
ways that S could have been murdered other than by being shot, of course, so perhaps the 
wrongness we are looking for is not an exclusive property of the act of shooting someone, but 
of what some shootings and all other acts of murder have in common: namely, that they are 
premeditated and unlawful killings. We can then claim that whatever fits this description 
possesses ‘wrongness’. 
 
There are two issues with this move. First, it is not clear how one could describe ‘unlawful’ in 
a way that is not circular or culturally and historically dependent, thereby making the concept 
‘unlawful’ (which is a key part of what it is to commit murder) not an independent property of 
the world. Of course, moral realists do not require all putatively moral claims to pick out 
correctly independent truth-apt moral properties of the world, only some; but, even if this is 
the case, murder would seem to be a paradigm example of moral wrongness and therefore 
something that we need to be able to proffer an independent description of. 
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Second, putting aside the seeming lack of independence of the concept ‘unlawful’ and 
therefore ‘murder’, perhaps more importantly, what remains unclear is the relationship 
between premeditated and unlawful killing and wrongness? It is not obvious that such a 
description entails ‘wrongness’; nor is the relationship analytic (such that an analysis of the 
concept of ‘premeditated, unlawful killing’ contains the concept of ‘wrongness’). I will return 
to this last point in Section 3 when discussing supervenience. 
 
Of course, moral realists might object to the argument above. It may be claimed, for example, 
that a conservative theologist does not object to murder simply because it is unlawful but 
because murder being wrong is a theological fact.3 In response, one might enquire as to the 
basis of this ‘fact’. Is the alleged fact that murder is wrong a fact because God degrees that it 
is? If it is, it would appear that murder being wrong is contingent on the will of God. As such, 
if God willed that murder is good would it then be a theological fact that murder is good? 
Alternatively, is murder being wrong a moral fact independent of God’s will and therefore 
something God cannot will to be otherwise? If this is the case then one might question the 
omnipotence of God: for there would appear to be at least one moral fact that even God must 
subscribe to.  
 
If the wrongness of murder is a moral fact (that even God must subscribe to) then, although it 
is not reduced to unlawfulness, it nevertheless remains unclear why it is wrong. The grounds 
for its status as a brute fact have yet to be established. If, on the other hand, murder is wrong 
because God says it is, and for this reason forms part of God’s law/moral code, then, to 
                                                          
3 I thank the anonymous reviewer for raising this point. 
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reiterate, such a ‘fact’ appears to be contingent on the will of God and is not necessarily the 
case. Consequently, it is still reducible to unlawfulness, only this time in relation to God’s law. 
A moral fact that is not necessarily, but only contingently, so undermines moral realism. 
 
So far, I have argued that moral utterances have both a descriptive and evaluative component, 
even where the same word serves as both a description and an evaluation (e.g., murderer). 
How might the discussion on descriptivism and the argument against moral realism inform 
the issue concerning the respective meanings of “x is morally wrong” and “VR/E(x) is 
morally wrong”? Consider the following: 
 
1. Shooting S is morally wrong 
2. Virtually shooting S is morally wrong 
3. A is a murderer 
4. Virtual A is a virtual murderer 
 
Each statement (1-4) has a descriptive component (‘shooting S’ and ‘virtually shooting S’, ‘A 
being a murderer’ and ‘virtual A being a virtual murderer’). In each case, the evaluative 
component is the same: it is ‘morally wrong’. This is either explicitly stated in the case of (1) 
and (2) or implied in (3) and (4). All propositions can therefore be said to conform to the 
same structure: namely, [description] + [evaluation], although in the case of (3) and (4), the 
descriptive term also serves as the evaluative term. The descriptive component, whether 
referring to the virtual or non-virtual, does not describe a moral property; it does not pick out 
that which is morally good or bad, right or wrong. The moral work is being done by the 
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evaluative component. In the next section, I consider the relationship between the description 
and the evaluation in more detail. 
 
3. Moral supervenience 
If each moral utterance contains two components which function in different ways – namely, 
descriptive and evaluative – such that, in the case of the latter evaluative component, the 
predicate “is morally wrong” not only describes that property (of ‘wrongness’) as moral 
realism claims but does so as a means of evaluating x or VR/E(x), then what is the 
relationship between each component? Moral supervenience holds that a moral property M 
(the ‘wrongness’ of x, for example) is said to be supervenient on a physical (non-moral) 
property P such that there can be no change in M without a change in P (see Blackburn, 1971, 
1984, 1985). This supervenient relation is famously illustrated by Hare (1952): 
 
Suppose that we say ‘St. Francis was a good man’. It is logically impossible to say this and to maintain at 
the same time that there might have been another man placed exactly in the same circumstances as St. 
Francis, and who behaved in exactly the same way, but who differed from St. Francis in this respect only, 
that he was not a good man. (p.145) 
 
The relationship between the moral property of ‘goodness’ and the non-moral or physical 
properties that constitute St Francis – his physical description – is such that there can be no 
moral change in the absence of a physical/behavioural change. This, of course, does not mean 
that any physical difference must entail a moral difference. If a physical duplicate of St 
Francis were suddenly to find that his hair had gone grey overnight or that he had suddenly 
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become short-sighted, then it is unlikely (or certainly would not necessitate) that this would 
have any impact (detrimental or otherwise) on his ‘goodness’. Any physical difference 
between the duplicate saints, if it is to be cited as the reason for a moral difference between 
the two men, must constitute reasonable grounds for this difference (Sidgwick, [1874] 1981); 
it must be a physical difference of the right kind. 
 
It seems to be the case that if it is said of a that a is morally good then, a priori, where a is 
identical to b, this entails that it must likewise be said of b that b is morally good. A failure to 
conclude that b is morally good indicates a failure to understand moral concepts. A 
consequence of this a priori truth is that the moral property of ‘goodness’ – which in this case 
renders St Francis a good man – is dependent on some physical (non-moral) property of the 
right kind. But ‘moral goodness’ is not reducible to this physical property; it is not something 
that we can describe in purely physical terms. As such, in addition to there being no change in 
M without a change in P, moral supervenience holds that M is irreducible to P (Ridge, 2007). 
Neither is the relationship analytic whereby a physical description of a (or b, if identical) 
would reveal to us those components that make up moral goodness. In other words, the 
proposition ‘a is morally good’ is not analytic in the way ‘a triangle has three sides’ is. 
Furthermore, we do not directly detect, a posteriori, the actual instantiation of a moral 
property (say, wrongness); rather, we “conclude that particular acts are wrong in virtue of 
some empirically detectable feature; for example, because it causes pain, involves deceit, or 
violates an agreement (etc.)” (Coons, 2011, p.85; emphasis in original) and, in doing so 
“postulate the unobserved to explain the observed” (ibid.) (see Section 5). 
 
3.1 Moral perception 
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McNaughton (1988), in contrast, argues that moral properties are directly observable: for if 
“we are prepared to allow that I can see that this cliff is dangerous, that Smith is worried... 
[etc.] then there seems no reason to be squeamish about letting in moral observation” (p.57). 
Thus, for McNaughton, observing that a is good (or bad) is compatible with perceiving that 
the cliff is dangerous (see also Chappell, 2008). Do we perceive ‘dangerousness’ directly as 
McNaughton would have us believe? 
 
Gibson (1979) proposed that potential for action could be directly perceived in the form of 
affordances. An affordance property should be understood as a relational property that reflects 
characteristics of the object and the action capabilities of the subject. Typically, a path 
through the jungle affords traversability (for example), or a rock affords grasping and 
throwing. Each of these properties can be directly perceived. A steep cliff face may afford a 
lack of traversability to the untrained eye (that is, someone who is not a trained climber and/or 
does not have the necessary equipment). It may also afford rapid decent in the guise of falling, 
but falling is not the same as dangerousness; although it is likely to lead someone to conclude 
that the cliff face is dangerous for this reason. Certainly, one can connect the judgement that it 
is dangerous to some physical characteristic of the cliff, in conjunction with physical 
characteristics of the subject (i.e., the potential for rapid descent for me), but this is not the 
same as saying that dangerousness is a property directly observable. Instead, the 
dangerousness of the cliff face is a conclusion one draws about this object in virtue of the fact 
that it affords (among other things) limited traversability and rapid decent; in much the same 
way that the goodness of a is a conclusion one draws about a given the fact (let us say) that a 
increases overall pleasure to me but not at the cost of increased displeasure for anyone else 
(again, see Section 5). To say “I can see that the cliff face is dangerous” is not to see 
‘dangerousness’ as an object of perception; rather, it is to see that the cliff face has limited 
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traversibility, etc. (in virtue of what it affords) and so warrants the judgement “It is dangerous 
(for me)”. 
 
3.2 Attitudinal supervenience 
When spoken intelligently and sincerely, the respective propositions “It is dangerous (for 
me)” and “a is morally good” are equivalent to asserting “I believe it is dangerous (for me)” 
or “I believe that a is morally good”. In light of this, and focusing again on moral properties, 
given that the relationship between a and moral goodness is not analytic, nor is moral 
goodness directly detectable a posteriori, it is left unclear how our moral beliefs are justified. 
A way to overcome this problem is to hold that the proposition “a is morally good” does not 
express a belief about a in terms of some independent moral fact – that can either be true or 
false – which one is obliged to justify in light of the possibility of it being false. Instead, it is 
an expression of one’s attitude towards a that, broadly construed, amounts either to one’s 
approval or disapproval of a.4 Importantly, the supervenient constraint should still hold in the 
case of one’s moral attitude: for, where a is identical to b, if one morally approves of a then 
one should morally approve of b also. 
 
Contra moral realism, the evaluative component of the proposition “x is morally wrong” 
should not be thought of as a description of some mind-independent moral property which 
functions in an evaluative way. Instead, it should be thought of as a direct expression of one’s 
attitude to x which functions in an evaluative way. A supervenient relation therefore holds 
between x and one’s attitude to x. As such, given the supervenient relation between x and 
‘moral wrongness’ (qua one’s attitude to x), where y is identical to x then y should also be 
                                                          
4 For the sake of simplicity, I have discounted a morally neutral attitude. 
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morally wrong. In the case of x and VR/E(x), however, these two properties are not identical. 
It does not follow from our discussion on supervenience that VR/E(x) is morally wrong 
because x is morally wrong, although this does not negate VR/E(x)’s moral wrongness for 
another reason (Young, 2013). Moreover, in light of the irreducible nature of moral properties 
to non-moral (physical) properties, and the argument that moral utterances are not referring to 
mind-independent properties of the world but to one’s attitude towards x or VR/E(x), it seems 
that what is being conveyed by either statement – “x is morally…” and “VR/E(x) is 
morally…” – is simply one’s attitude. In the next section, I explore this idea further. 
 
4. Expressivism 
Expressivism (see Blackburn, 1985; Gibbard, 1990; Horgan & Timmons, 2006) argues that a 
sentence like “x is morally wrong” is not describing some mind-independent property of x that 
we happened to have detected or otherwise stumbled upon (namely, its wrongness). Instead, it 
indicates our reaction to x which we express in the form of a negative attitude (in this case). 
As an aside, expressivism should be viewed as a continuation of/improvement on emotivism 
(Ayer, 1952; Stevenson, 1937) and the sentimentalist tradition of Hume (see Section 6) in 
which moral utterances are expressions of one’s attitude (expressivism) not simply one’s 
emotions (emotivism). It is therefore because the proposition ‘x is morally wrong’ is not 
describing some independent fact about a representation or act within the world that it cannot 
be true or false. At best, if uttered sincerely, it simply expresses the subject’s disapproval of x, 
much like declaring “Boo x!” Talk of moral properties should not, then, be talk of properties 
realized by certain non-moral (physical) properties (of the right kind). Instead, they should be 
thought of as the projection5 of one’s attitude onto certain physical properties of the world. 
                                                          
5 For this reason, this approach is sometimes referred to as projectivism. 
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The truth of expressivism therefore entails that there is no moral reality independent of our 
attitudinal projections; but this fact (the negation of moral realism) does not entail 
expressivism (Ross, 2009). So why does it come about? Perhaps what expressivism reveals is 
a contingent psychological truth about us. 
 
In the case of, say, a positive moral utterance, expressivism postulates that one is simply 
expressing a preference or an idea of what one wants or wishes to affirm, or perceives to be an 
“ok thing to do” and nothing more (Ross, 2009). To illustrate further, Ross invites us to: 
 
Imagine an artist who feels a strong preference for abstract expressionism over figurative painting – this 
value utterly structures his life. But no one, including the artist himself, thinks of the sentence “Abstract 
expressionism is in all ways superior to figurative painting” as expressing a fact in the world he was lucky 
enough to detect. (ibid., p.48) 
 
Analogous to the claim of the artist, and what it does and does not mean, expressivism holds 
that a moral claim is a description articulating how one feels about x – one’s attitude towards 
x, whether positive or negative, which will likely shape one’s actions – and not a way of 
demonstrating one’s ability to detect some independent property of x. 
 
If we accept that the proposition “x is morally wrong” is equivalent to “x is something I 
disapprove of” then, given the previous discussion, it is also equivalent to “I believe that x is 
something I disapprove of”. Yet, crucially, where moral wrongness or rightness is said to be 
nothing more than an expression of moral attitude, rather than part of the actual make-up of x, 
one’s belief (that x is something I disapprove of) becomes self-evident – and so justified – 
every time one sincerely and intelligently asserts “x is morally wrong”. 
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When thought of in this way, the supervenience relation ceases to be a relation between two 
sets of real properties – one non-moral and the other moral – and so ceases to describe a 
metaphysical relation. Instead, it becomes a way of governing our moral attitudes and the 
moral language designed to express them. As Meyers (2012) explains: 
 
Instead of saying that every token of the same natural type must possess the same moral properties, we 
can say that every token of the same natural type must be ascribed the same moral predicates. If one 
attaches a moral predicate (such as “is morally wrong”) to some token action, then one must attach that 
same moral predicate to any other token action of the same type. (p.19) 
 
Even in the absence of truth-aptness, one’s moral attitude is still required to be consistent. 
Therefore, the predicates one ascribes must show this to be the case. To develop a point made 
in Section 3.2, if one has a negative attitude towards a token of x (xtoken1) then one should also 
have a negative attitude towards a different token of x (xtoken2) and this should accord with the 
predicates ascribed. 
 
By ascribing the predicate “is morally wrong” to x, one is expressing a particular state of 
mind (an attitude) towards x. To say “I disapprove of x”, on the other hand, is to report 
directly one’s attitude (the same attitude) expressed by “x is morally wrong”. For expressivists, 
the propositions “x is morally wrong” and “I disapprove of x” amount to descriptions of the 
same state of mind; they differ only insofar as the former is an expression of that which the 
latter reports explicitly. 
 
4.1 Expressivisn and gamespace 
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If applied to VR/Es, expressivism does not appear to undermine the amoralist argument that 
there is no case to answer. If moral utterances are simply expressions of one’s attitude 
towards VR/E(x) then such utterances have no truth-aptness and so cannot be said to be true 
or false. Thus, the proposition “virtual murder (or rape, paedophilia, etc.) is wrong” is 
equivalent to “Boo virtual murder (rape, paedophilia, etc.)” which itself carries as much moral 
weight as “Hurray virtual murder (rape, paedophilia, etc.)”. In neither case, has one detected 
some independent property of moral rightness or wrongness with regard to VR/E(x). 
 
But if expressivism is true then it is not only true for proposition “VR/E(x) is morally…” but 
also “x is morally…” In other words, it is not only true when expressing one’s attitude about 
virtual representations and enactments but also when expressing one’s attitude towards non-
virtual representations and actions. If the claim that “murder is wrong” is equivalent to “Boo 
murder” which, in terms of moral weight, is on par with “Hurray murder” then even if 
everyone in the world intelligently and sincerely expresses the view that murder is wrong 
(they are of one mind on this matter, let us allow), given that virtual murder is not equivalent 
to actual murder, this does not entail that everyone will express the view that virtual murder is 
wrong (likewise with virtual rape, paedophilia, etc.). Moreover, in the scenario just described, 
under expressivism, it cannot be said to be true that murder is wrong, only that everyone is of 
the opinion that it is wrong. Where opinions differ (as is the case with virtual murder, it is fair 
to say), there seems to be no place within expressivism for claims that one view is right and 
the other view is wrong because neither is picking out some independent moral truth. 
 
The expressivist may argue that this is indeed the case, and not just with VR/Es but with any 
act or representation that is subject to moral scrutiny. A consequence of this is that moral 
policing (prohibition and censorship) becomes a matter of consensus and majority rule 
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without legitimate reference to right and wrong beyond the ascription of predicates reflecting 
one’s moral attitude (See Section 6 for a return to this point). In the case of moral violations 
mentioned previously (murder, rape, paedophilia), each of these can be morally prohibited 
(even legally so) and even be consistently referred to as things which are morally wrong 
without it being the case that it is true that they are moral wrongs insofar as the propositions 
pick out some property of wrongness that exists independently of one’s negative attitude. 
 
4.2 Problems with expressivism 
We have seen that expressivism holds that the propositions “x is morally wrong” and “I 
disapprove of x” describe the same negative attitude (the same state of mind of the subject), 
only the former is said to expresses it while the latter reports it. The predicate “is morally 
wrong” is therefore merely a way of expressing subject S’s disapproval of x. The truth of x’s 
wrongness equates to (is nothing but) the truth of S’s disapproval of x. Given this, it seems 
that the following somewhat counter-intuitive position holds: If I did not disapprove of x then 
x would not be morally wrong. Conversely, if I approved of x then x would be morally right; 
or even, it is the fact that I approve of x that makes x morally right. Of course, what these 
statements actually articulate is the following: If I intelligently and sincerely report my 
attitude to x in a certain way (say, “I disapprove of x”) then it follows that I would express this 
attitude in a manner congruent with the way I report it (that “x is morally wrong”, for 
example). The relationship between approval/disapproval and rightness/wrongness seems 
reasonable if one is expressing one’s attitude towards, say, a particular form of music (e.g., 
heavy metal, jazz or rap) or art (cubism or surrealism, perhaps) or some social convention 
such as queuing. Thus, given that I disapprove of queuing, it makes sense that I would express 
this disapproving attitude in the following way: “Queuing is wrong”. 6  It also seems 
                                                          
6 Perhaps in the case of music or art, one would be more inclined to say bad rather than wrong. 
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reasonable to accept the following (or at least accept that it should be seen as less of a concern 
given what it is about): I express my attitude about queuing – that it is wrong – if and only if I 
disapprove of queuing. Here, one may acknowledge that there is a rational relation embedded 
within the statement (between moral utterance and attitude) irrespective of whether one shares 
the attitude towards queuing. 
 
Consider, then, the following:  
 
1. I express my attitude that murder is morally right if I approve of murder. 
 
Irrespective of whether or not one approves of murder, one should attest to the coherence of 
this proposition: that it necessarily follows that if I approve of murder then I should assert that 
it is morally right.7 Now consider the following: 
 
2. I express my attitude that murder is morally right if and only if I approve of murder. 
 
Proposition (2) is, again, logically coherent. But do we want to allow, as (2) indicates, that the 
only reason I assert that murder is morally right is because I approve of it: to the point of 
claiming that one’s approval is both necessary and sufficient for the claim that murder is 
morally right? If this is the case, then one need look no further than one’s positive attitude to 
find a reason to claim that murder is a morally good thing to do. The next example, illustrates 
well the point I am making: 
 
3. I express my attitude that murder is morally wrong if and only if I disapprove of murder. 
                                                          
7 For the sake of brevity, I am discounting that one’s approval of murder co-occurs with one’s amoralist view. 
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Do we really wish to accept that the only reason for me to express the proposition “murder is 
wrong” is that “I disapprove of it”? For some, this may seem counter-intuitive; yet this is 
precisely the position expressivism adopts. Perhaps what we are looking for, instead, is the 
idea that one’s attitude coincides with some independent moral truth and that this independent 
moral truth is the reason why I have the corresponding attitude I do. If this is so, then such a 
position is not to be found within expressivism. 
 
4.3 Moral utterances as more than expressions of attitude 
It also seems to be the case that we sometimes devise moral statements about x that do not 
express our attitude towards x. This is often referred to as the Frege-Geach problem for 
expressivism (see Geach, 1965). To illustrate: if it is morally wrong to murder then it follows 
that it is morally wrong to persuade one’s friend to murder. This statement makes a moral 
claim in its conclusion through its adherence to a logical structure (modus ponens) but it does 
so without expressing the attitude of the subject: for I can accept that the conclusion 
necessarily follows from the premise without agreeing with the claim that murder is morally 
wrong. In other words, I can accept that if it were the case that murder is morally wrong then 
it necessarily follows that the conclusion – it is morally wrong to persuade one’s friend to 
murder – is true. As it is irrational to agree with this premise while denying the conclusion, I 
can accept the necessity of the moral claim given the moral premise; but I am able to do all of 
this without any part of the aforementioned statement expressing my own attitude towards 
murder. 
 
The Frege-Geach problem illustrates that moral utterances function in ways other than to 
express one’s attitude or even one’s belief about one’s attitude; rather, they constitute beliefs 
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about moral rights and wrongs that allow for logical coherence independent (and therefore 
irrespective) of one’s attitude. In other words, such utterances are sufficiently independent of 
one’s attitude to form compositionally stable content which can be embedded in logically 
complex contexts (Chrisman, 2011). As a means of overcoming this problem, let us consider 
a recent development within expressivism. 
 
5. Ecumenical Expressivism 
According to ecumenical expressivism (Ridge, 2006), when uttered, the proposition “x is 
wrong” reveals two interrelated facts about the mental states of the subject. The first concerns 
an attitude. The second relates to a particular belief which is said to make anaphoric reference 
to this attitude.8 Importantly, though, for proponents of ecumenical expressivism, the subject 
does not hold a negative attitude (in this case) towards a particular act. Instead, in the case of 
‘x is wrong’, the subject disapproves of some property – call it P – and believes that x realizes 
P. Thus, in declaring that theft (which in descriptive terms equates to taking something 
without authorization/permission) is wrong, the subject holds a negative attitude towards P 
and believes that an act of theft (taking something without authorization/permission) realizes 
P. Moreover, in stating that theft is wrong, the subject is not (should not be) declaring only 
that this (token) act of stealing is wrong but, rather, that the type of action of which this 
particular act is a token – in virtue of realizing property P – is wrong. Where a different type 
of act realizes the same property, then one should disapprove of any token act of this action-
type. If kidnapping, for example, realizes property P, then if one disapproves of theft (in 
virtue of property P) then one should also disapprove of kidnapping. 
 
                                                          
8 An anaphoric reference occurs when a word in a text refers to a previous idea in the text for its meaning. In the 
sentence “Fred always looked unkempt but this never seemed to bother him”, the word ‘him’ clearly refers to 
Fred. 
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Now, what counts as property P may differ from individual to individual. Some may view P 
in terms of negative utility (the realizing of more displeasure than pleasure, say; which is a 
posteriori discoverable), while others may hold it to be a violation of God’s law, or 
characteristic of a failure in one’s duty to others, or a vice rather than a virtue, and so on. 
Declaring “x is wrong” – where x equates to theft – reveals the following: 
 
(i) Subject S disapproves of P and believes that x realizes P (thus making anaphoric 
reference to that which S disapproves of). 
 
Given that what counts as P can vary from subject to subject, in the case of negative utility we 
get: 
 
(ii) Subject S disapproves of P (where P equates to increased negative utility) and believes 
that x realizes P (thus making anaphoric reference to that which S disapproves of). 
 
Or where P equates to a violation of God’s law: 
 
(iii) Subject S disapproves of P (where P equates to violating God’s law) and believes that 
x realizes P (thus making anaphoric reference to that which S disapproves of). 
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In accordance with a meta-ethical approach, ecumenical expressivism does not hold that x is 
morally wrong because it increases negative utility or violates God’s law. It holds that what it 
means to say that x is morally wrong is that x (whatever x describes) realizes some property P 
(whatever P is) and the subject (a) disapproves of P and (b) believes that x realizes P. 
Ecumenical expressivism thus provides the framework for explaining the meaning of “x is 
wrong” by explaining what it means for x to be wrong irrespective of what x is or the 
particular reason for one’s disapproval of some property P that S believes x realizes. 
 
One’s disapproval of P is not truth-apt but whether or not x realizes P is truth-apt. The 
independent truth-aptness of P and its relation to x therefore allows moral utterances to 
express more than one’s attitude and therefore form the stable content of logical structures 
irrespective of one’s attitude, as noted by the Frege-Geach problem. Recall the following 
example: “If it is morally wrong to murder then it follows that it is morally wrong to persuade 
one’s friend to murder”. This statement is problematic for traditional expressivism because 
moral wrongness is playing a role that is more than the expression of a negative attitude; it is 
adhering to a logical structure (modus ponens). However, if one holds the following: If x 
(murder) is wrong because it realizes P (a truth-apt condition), which I happen to disapprove 
of, then persuading one’s friend to commit x (murder) would also realize P (which we know I 
happen to disapprove of) which entails that this is also wrong. In addition to one’s attitude 
towards P, and therefore x in virtue of its act of realizing P, the independent truth-aptness of P 
(independent of one’s attitude) allows moral utterances about x to form the content of logical 
structures. It is in virtue of x’s realizing P, which occurs both in the case of one’s x-ing and 
persuading one’s friend to x, that enables compliance with modus ponens. This, one can 
acknowledge irrespective of whether one approves of P or not. 
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One might object that all ecumenical expressivism does is replace moral claims about x with 
moral claims about P. In other words, proponents of ecumenical expressivism have simply 
added an extra component to the moral debate – namely, some property P – and so switched 
the focus away from the particular event x to a property (P) realized by x. If one disapproves 
of x in virtue of its realized property P then what remains unclear is why one should 
disapprove of P in the first place.9 
 
We know that, in keeping with expressivism, ecumenical expressivism endorses the view that 
any moral claim about P is simply an expression of one’s attitude. Therefore, the only truth-
aptness regarding negative assertions about x is that the utterer disapproves of P and believes 
that P is realized by x. This disapproval finds expression in the form “x is morally wrong”. All 
that ecumenical expressivism explains, then, is what the subject means when he/she says that 
x is morally wrong. How ecumenical expressivism differs from expressivism is that, with the 
inclusion of property P, the content of one’s disapproval and with it the reason for one’s 
disapproval (of x) can vary from subject to subject. Importantly, what ecumenical 
expressivism does not provide is a means of identifying the ‘correct’ (qua most justified) 
moral position regarding P and subsequently x, or indeed any objective justification at all for 
the disapproval of P or x. 
 
It is not within the remit of ecumenical expressivism to justify the approval or disapproval of 
some property (P) realized by x. What ecumenical expressivism entails is the negation of 
moral realism; what it suggests is that established or alleged objective moral thinking is 
                                                          
9 Again, I thank the anonymous reviewer for drawing my attention to this point. 
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nothing but the elevation of one particular attitude over contrasting others. This may be the 
case; but this is not to deny some form of moral reality as I intend to show in Section 6: for if 
constructive ecumenical expressivism is to prove useful in the continuing debate over the 
moral status of video game content then it must offer more than a moral position consisting of 
a plethora of different attitudes with no way of differentiating between them in terms of moral 
weight. Before discussing how moral consensus might be achieved, however, let us first apply 
ecumenical expressivism to gamespace. 
 
5.1 Ecumenical Expressivism and gamespace 
Recall that the overarching aim of this paper is to explain the meaning of moral utterances of 
the kind “x is morally wrong” and “VR/E(x) is morally wrong”. The extent to which some 
property (P) realized by either x or VR/E(x) is the same is the extent to which supervenience 
determines that one’s attitude to this property and ultimately to x and VR/E(x) should be the 
same. To illustrate, it may be that: 
 
(a) Subject S disapproves of P (where P equates to increased negative utility) and believes 
that x and VR/E(x) each realize P (thus making anaphoric reference to that which S 
disapproves of). 
 
Of course, it may be that x and VR/(x) do not realize the same property P but in fact realize 
different properties – say p1 and p2 which S also disapproves of. Thus, it may be that: 
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(b) Subject S disapproves of p1 and believes that x realizes p1 (thus making anaphoric 
reference to that which S disapproves of). 
 
And 
 
(c) Subject S disapproves of p2 and believes that VR/E(x) realizes p2 (thus making anaphoric 
reference to that which S disapproves of). 
 
Why p1 and p2 are disapproved of may be for the same reason (say, increasing negative utility) 
or for different reasons (increased negative utility and violating God’s law, respectively). It 
may of course be that one is approved of and the other not. After all, it would hardly strike the 
reader as incoherent that the vast majority of gamers who play violent video games have an 
approving attitude toward virtual murder but not actual murder. Neither is it contentious to 
say that, where disapproval of VR/E(x) exists, it is likely to be as a result of its relationship to 
x (i.e., that it is virtually representing/enacting x) and the fact that, first and foremost, one 
disapproves of x. But this likelihood does not entail that if one disapproves of x one must also 
disapprove of VR/E(x). After all, as we have established, the relation between x and VR/E(x) 
is not one of identity. But, to reiterate, the reason for one’s approval or disapproval is not the 
issue here; what is of concern is making sense of one’s moral utterances.  
 
6. Constructive sentimentalism 
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Prinz (2007) presents what he calls constructive sentimentalism. This is the view that although 
moral judgements stem from sentiment, or what Hume ([1739] 1978) refers to as feelings of 
disapprobation or approbation (recall the brief mention of emotivism in Section 4; see also 
Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley & Cohen 2001; Nichols & Mallon 2005), these 
sentiments nevertheless form the basis for rules which have their own objective status within 
the socially constructed space they occupy (Copp, 2011, likens this view to what he calls 
realist expressivism; see also Copp, 2001). As Prinz states: “Things that we construct or build 
come from us, but, once there, they are real entities that we perceive” (2007, p.168). Prinz’s 
position is compatible with the neo-sentimentalism proffered by Gibbard (1990), who argues 
that wrongful acts are judged to be so, not simply because one has a negative feeling towards 
the act but because such a feeling is appropriate. The addition of this normative element – that 
the negative feeling of guilt (for example) is not simply something we happen to feel but what 
we should feel – means, for Nichols (2008), that “even if one has lost any disposition to feel 
guilt about a certain action, one can still think that feeling guilty is warranted” (p.258; 
emphasis in original). Nichols goes on to argue that the emotions we feel in relation to a given 
action have helped shape our cultural norms, by determining which are sustained and which 
are lost. His affective resonance hypothesis essentially states that: “Norms that prohibit 
actions to which we are predisposed to be emotionally averse will enjoy enhanced cultural 
fitness over other norms” (ibid., p.269). 
 
For the new generation of sentimentalists like Prinz and Nichols, whether an action is deemed 
good or bad, or right or wrong, is in no small part dependent on the emotion we feel towards 
that action. However, these theorists have built on more traditional Humean sentimentalism 
by arguing for a degree of objectification within a given space. If at a given time I experience 
a sense of disapprobation towards an individual’s actions, this does not as a general rule – 
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based on how I feel right now – make my disapproval grounds for the judgement that what 
this person is doing is bad; nor does it make my disapproval a good thing, unless the 
disapproval is warranted. 
 
7. Constructive ecumenical expressivism 
In the same way that expressivism is seen as a progression from emotivism (feelings of 
disapproval in the form of disgust, for example) – by positing moral utterances as expressions 
of attitude rather than sentiment – it is my contention that one can borrow from neo-
sentimentalists like Prinz and argue for constructive ecumenical expressivism. Such a position 
is not incompatible with constructive sentimentalism; it does however have a wider scope 
owing to the fact that it does not describe moral utterances exclusively in terms of sentiment 
but, rather, in terms of one’s attitude: although I accept that this may in part be shaped by 
some form of association with sentiment. As such, it may be that irrespective of whether, as 
an individual, one approves or disapproves of x, if it is the case that x realizes property P then 
it may be that one ought to disapprove of x in virtue of this fact and the fact that it is an 
established cultural norm (objectification of attitudes towards P) that property P is 
disapproved of and therefore wrong. 
 
Constructive ecumenical expressivism proffers the freedom for different subgroups to 
disapprove of P for different reasons, each objectified within their sub-culture. Subgroups 1-3 
may each disapprove of x in virtue of x realizing P, but recognize P as being a different 
property in each case (as ecumenical expressivism allows). Group 1 may hold that P equates 
to increased negative utility, group 2 to the violation of God’s law and group 3 to a vice rather 
than a virtue. In each case, a meta-ethical approach maintains that the sub-groups mean the 
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same thing when they utter “x is morally wrong” despite having different reasons for holding 
the attitude they do. 10 
 
In the case of the moral utterance “VR/E(x) is morally wrong”, one’s disapproval of VR/E(x) 
may occur because one holds that x is morally wrong (to some, this may have strong intuitive 
appeal in cases of virtual rape or paedophilia). What has not been established in the case of 
VR/E(x), however, is any sense in which one’s disapproval is warranted and therefore has 
been established as a cultural or even sub-cultural norm. Has it been established that x and 
VR/E(x) realize the same property P which is morally proscribed? Or is it that, in light of the 
fact that x ≠ VR/E(x), each event realizes a different property and only the property realized 
by the former event has achieved some form of moral consensus? Therefore, while the 
structure of the two propositions may be the same from a meta-ethical point of view, in the 
absence of an established cultural norm, unlike “x is morally wrong” (in virtue of realizing 
some property P) – where x equates to murder or rape or paedophilia – the proposition 
“VR/E(x) is morally wrong” (qua virtual murder/rape/paedophilia) does not reflect any 
established moral objectification within either the virtual gaming space to which the utterance 
is directed or the non-virtual social community looking on. From a meta-ethical perspective 
which endorses constructive ecumenical expressivism, the meaning of “x is morally wrong” 
and “VR/E(x) is morally wrong is equivalent. Where they depart is that, given the need for 
moral authority based on objectified moral norms rather than moral realism, the former 
utterance is deemed to be warranted whereas, at present, the latter is not; or at least cannot be 
said to be warranted owing to the lack of such norms with regard to VR/Es. 
                                                          
10 I am not discounting the possibility that an individual or group may recognize that x realizes each of these 
things: negative utility, violation of God’s law, vice. Nevertheless, it is likely that one will be held as a more 
fundamental reason for disapproval than the others. 
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In short, constructive ecumenical expressivism explains the consensus found regarding the 
immorality of murder, rape and paedophilia in terms of a shared negative attitude towards x 
(the act of murder, rape, paedophilia), not because of the act itself but some property (P) 
realized by the act (x). Different reasons may therefore be proffered for the negative attitude, 
but given that these different reasons are seen to be justifying the agreed moral condemnation 
of x, a state of objectification can be established whereby this condemnation is judged to be 
warranted. Because VR/E(x) ≠ x, however, whatever shared condemnation of x exists does not 
necessitate the shared condemnation and therefore the objectification of a negative moral 
attitude towards VR/E(x). It has not been established that the moral condemnation of VR/E(x) 
– that is, virtual murder/rape/paedophilia – is warranted given that it has not been established 
that each event (x and VR/E(x), respectively) realize the same property P. To reiterate, a 
priori, no argument to the contrary has been established (Luck, 2009; Young, 2013) and, a 
posteriori, evidence is at best mixed that VR/E(x) results in some form of increased negative 
utility (Schulzke, 2010) and, in some cases, simply unavailable. 
 
So if it is the case that utterances about the morality of gaming content are merely expressions 
of attitude that lack the same level of consensus and therefore objectification as that found in 
non-virtual examples, then how is constructive ecumenical expressivism to inform the debate 
over VR/E(x) – say, the virtual torture and rape of a non-player character (NPC) – and 
whether it is morally problematic or whether, as the amoralist attests, it is just part of a game 
and therefore not a moral matter? Constructive ecumenical expressivism may help us 
understand the nature of moral utterances and why no moral consensus is forthcoming 
regarding VR/Es, but can it help us move towards a consensus, and what might that consensus 
32 
 
be? The present answer may be unsatisfactory. It is my contention that, a priori, there is no 
means of identifying which, if any, property P, realized by VR/E(x), is more justified as a 
measure of moral praise or condemnation. Elsewhere, I have argued that decisions about 
which gaming content (if any) should be prohibited, and which should not, should be based, 
not on any particular approach to morality but on the extent to which, psychologically, we can 
cope in our interacting with them (Young & Whitty, 2012). At present, given the absence of 
psychological research detailing how well we are able to cope with such symbolically violent 
and/or otherwise taboo interactions, all we can say for now is that if a consensus is to be 
arrived at about which content should be prohibited then it is likely that it will be based on a 
shared condemnation of VR/E(x) in light of some property P that VR/E(x) realizes. This does 
not mean or even require, however, that there is a consensus on what constitutes P, although I 
proffer that it should be based on the psychological effects on those engaged in VR/E(x); 
rather, it requires only that P (which will amount to different things for different people) is 
realized by VR/E(x): a position constitutive of constructive ecumenical expressivism. 
 
As a final point, it may be objected that seeking a posteriori evidence for negative 
psychological effects is simply a form of moral consequentialism. To be clear, psychological 
evidence should be used to inform decisions about which content (if any) to prohibit, but any 
decision to prohibit should not be a moral decision; it should not be based on the view that it 
is morally wrong or bad to engage in V/E(x), only that evidence indicates that it is 
psychologically damaging (for some or many/all) to do so. Any putative moral claim based on 
psychological evidence is not picking out some independent moral truth. Instead, as 
constructive ecumenical expressivism explains, it is nothing more than an attitude expressing 
disapproval couched in moral terms. Denying moral realism does not negate the possibility 
that a form of moral consensus may emerge, as discussed above, and this may be based on 
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future psychological evidence (or should be, I contend). If such a moral consensus is 
forthcoming at some future time regarding VR/Es, then what I hope to have provided here is a 
description of what that moral consensus amounts to: in effect what it means to declare 
“VR/E(x) is morally wrong”. 
 
8. Conclusion 
It has been the aim of this paper to proffer a meta-ethical approach to propositions which 
make reference to virtual and non-virtual interactions in order that we might better understand 
what is meant by utterances which exclaim that x or VR/E(x) “is morally wrong (or right, 
good or bad)”. I have rejected moral realism and proposed instead a form of expressivism that 
provides a moral framework applicable to both virtual and non-virtual engagements. 
Constructive ecumenical expressivism posits a form of objectified moral reality based on 
social norms such that one’s expression of negative attitude towards x or VR/E(x) can be 
judged appropriate or not depending on what is believed to be warranted. In the case of 
paradigm examples of morally prohibited acts – such as murder, rape and paedophilia – social 
norms and therefore consensus hold these to be things one should morally disapprove of. Why 
this is the case may vary, but constructive ecumenical expressivism is able to incorporate such 
variation into its approach. In the case, of virtual representation and interactions, however, 
despite the meaning of “VR/E(x) is morally wrong” being equivalent to “x is morally wrong” 
in terms of its meta-ethical structure, the lack of moral authority with regard to whether such 
an utterance is appropriate or not (that is, in keeping with what is warranted) can be explained, 
at present, by a lack of a prevailing social norm and majority consensus regarding those 
VR/Es that depict non-virtual, morally proscribed activities. 
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